As part of ISO standards on public-key encryption, Shoup introduced the framework of KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism), and DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism), for formalizing and realizing onedirectional hybrid encryption; KEM is a formalization of asymmetric encryption specified for key distribution, which DEM is a formalization of symmetric encryption. This paper investigates a more general hybrid protocol, secure channel, that uses KEM and DEM, while KEM supports distribution of a session key and DEM, along with the session key, is used for multiple bi-directional encrypted transactions in a session. This paper shows that KEM, which is semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), and DEM, which is semantically secure against adaptively chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IND-P2-C2), along with secure signatures and ideal certification authority are sufficient to realize a universally composable (UC) secure channel. To obtain the main result, this paper also shows several equivalence results: UC KEM, IND-CCA2 KEM and NM-CCA2 (non-malleable against CCA2) KEM are equivalent, and UC DEM, IND-P2-C2 DEM and NM-P2-C2 DEM are equivalent.
Introduction

Background
Shoup proposed the Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) for key distribution in public-key cryptosystems, as part of ISO standards on public-key encryption [11] .
The difference between KEM and public-key encryption (PKE) is as follows: PKE's encryption procedure, on input plaintext M and receiver R's public-key PK R , outputs ciphertext C, while KEM's encryption procedure, on input receiver R's public-key PK R , outputs ciphertext C and key K, where C is sent to R, and K is kept secret inside the sender, and employed in the subsequent process of data encryption. PKE's decryption procedure, on input C and † † The author is with the NTT Cyber Space Laboratries, NTT Corporation, Yokosuka-shi, 239-0847 Japan.
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a) E-mail: w-nagao@lab7.kuis.kyoto-u.ac.jp b) E-mail: manabe.yoshifumi@lab.ntt.co.jp c) E-mail: okamoto.tatsuaki@lab.ntt.co.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 1.28 secret-key S K R , outputs plaintext M, while KEM's decryption procedure, on input C and secret-key S K R , outputs key K. Although KEM is a mechanism for key distribution and the applications of KEM are not specified, the most typical application is hybrid encryption, where a key shared via KEM is employed for symmetric-key encryption. Shoup also formulated symmetric-key encryption as the Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM) [11] . Shoup defined the security notion, "indistinguishable (semantically secure) against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks," for KEM and DEM, respectively, (we call them IND-CCA2-KEM and IND-CCA2-DEM, respectively), and showed that hybrid encryption (HPKE) implemented by combining KEM with IND-CCA2-KEM and DEM with IND-CCA2-DEM is a PKE with IND-CCA2-PKE [7] , [11] * * .
Since the KEM-DEM hybrid encryption specified by Shoup is one-directional (or equivalent to public-key encryption in functionality), it is applicable for secure email and single direction transactions. However, in many secure protocols (e.g., SSL, IPSec, SSH), asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes are employed in a different manner as a secure channel such that an asymmetric encryption scheme is used for distribution of a session key while a symmetric encryption scheme with the session key is used for the many bi-directional encrypted transactions needed in a session.
The KEM-DEM framework can be modified to yield the secure channel; KEM can be used for key of a session key distribution and DEM with the session key is used for secure communications in the session. Since the KEM-DEM framework will be standardized in a near future, it seems a promising to employ the above-mentioned modified KEM-DEM framework to realize a secure channel. However, no research has been done on the security requirements of KEM and DEM such that a secure channel based on the modified KEM-DEM framework can guarantee a sufficient level of security, although KEM with IND-CCA2-KEM and DEM with IND-CCA2-DEM have been shown to be sufficient for an IND-CCA2-PKE single-directional KEM-DEM-hybrid scheme [7] , [11] . That is, we have the following problems:
• What are the security requirements of KEM and DEM to construct a secure channel? • How to define the satisfactory level of security of a secure channel? (since it cannot be characterized by just public-key encryption, and indeed requires a more complicated security definition.)
Our Results
This paper answers the above-mentioned problems:
• This paper shows that KEM with IND-CCA2-KEM and DEM with IND-P2-C2-DEM along with secure signatures and ideal certification authority are sufficient to realize a universally composable secure channel.
• We follow the definition of a universally composable secure channel as set by Canetti and Krawczyk [5] .
There are two major merits in using the universal composability paradigm. First, the paradigm provides a clear and unified (or standard) approach to defining the security of any cryptographic functionality including a secure channel. Second, our concrete construction of a secure channel based on the KEM-DEM framework guarantees not only stand-alone security but also universal composable security. Since a secure protocol like SSL, IPSec and SSH is often employed as an element of a large-scale security system, the universal composability of a secure protocol is especially important.
In order to obtain the above-mentioned main result, we first show that UC KEM, IND-CCA2 KEM and NM-CCA2 KEM are equivalent, and that UC DEM, IND-P2-C2 DEM and NM-P2-C2 DEM are equivalent. We then show that UC KEM and UC KEM as well as UC signatures and ideal certification authority are sufficient for realizing a UC secure channel.
Although this paper considers only single sessions, the same result is obtained for the multi-session case is obtained automatically via the UC with joint state (JUC) [6] .
Related Works
Canetti and Krawczyk [5] showed a UC secure channel protocol consisting of an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme, message authentication code, and pseudorandom generator. Accordingly, their results are specific to their construction. Our result is based on the general notions of KEM, DEM and signatures, but so are not restricted to any specific scheme.
The equivalence of UC PKE and IND-CCA2 PKE was suggested by Canetti [3] , and the equivalence of NM-CCA2 PKE and IND-CCA2 PKE was shown by Bellare et al. [1] , [2] . The relationships among several security notions of symmetric encryptions were investigated by Katz and Yung [9] . However, no results have been reported on the equivalence among UC KEM, IND-CCA2 KEM and NM-CCA2  KEM, and among UC DEM, IND-CCA2 DEM and NM-CCA2 DEM. 
The KEM-DEM Framework
We describe probabilistic algorithms and experiments with standard notations and conventions. For probabilistic algorithm A, A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r) is the result of running A with inputs of x 1 , x 2 , · · · and coins r. We let y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ) denote the experiment of picking r at random and letting y equal the output of A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r). If S is a finite set, then x ← S denotes the experiment of assigning to x an element uniformly chosen from S . If α is neither an algorithm nor a set, then x ← α indicates that we assign α to x. We say that y can be output by A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ) if there is some r such that A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r) = y.
Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Formally, key encapsulation mechanism KEM is given by the triple of algorithms KEM.KeyGen(), KEM.Encrypt (pk, options) and KEM.Decrypt(sk, C 0 ), where:
1. KEM.KeyGen(), the key generation algorithm, is a polynomial time and probabilistic algorithm that takes security parameter k ∈ N (provided in unary) and returns a pair (pk, sk) of matching public and secret keys. 2. KEM.Encrypt(pk, options), the encryption algorithm, is a polynomial time and probabilistic algorithm that takes as input public key pk, along with an optional options argument, and outputs a key/ciphertext pair (K, C 0 ). The role of options is analogous to that in public-key encryption. 3. KEM.Decrypt(sk, C 0 ), the decryption algorithm, is a polynomial time and deterministic algorithm that takes as input secret key sk and ciphertext C 0 , and outputs key K or special symbol ⊥ (⊥ implies that the ciphertext was invalid).
We require that for all (pk, sk) output by KEM.KeyGen(1 k ), and for all C 0 output by KEM.Encrypt(pk, options), KEM.Decrypt(sk, C 0 ) = K (|K| is denoted by KEM.OutputKeyLen -the length of the key output by KEM.Encrypt and KEM.Decrypt). Function : N → R is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0 there exists integer k c such that (k) ≤ k −c for all k ≥ k c . We write vectors in boldface, as in x. We also denote the number of components in x by |x|, and the i-th component by
). Additionally, we denote a component of a vector as x ∈ x or x x, which mean, respectively, that x is in or is not in the set { x[i] : 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|}. Such notions provide convenient descriptions. For example, we can simply write x ← KEM.Decrypt(y) as the shorthand form Decrypt(y[i] ). We will consider relations of arity t where t is polynomial in security parameter k. Rather than writing R(x 1 , · · · , x t ), we write R(x, x), meaning the first argument is special and the rest are bunched into vector x with |x| = t − 1.
Attack Types of KEM
We state the following three attack types of KEM. First, we state CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack). In CPA, an adversary is allowed to access only the encryption oracle not the decryption oracle. Second, in CCA1 (Chosen Ciphertext Attack), an adversary is allowed to access encryption and decryption oracles. However, the adversary cannot access the decryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. Third, in CCA2 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack), an adversary is allowed to access encryption and decryption oracles even after the adversary gets the target ciphertext.
Indistinguishability of KEM
We use IND-ATK-KEM to describe the security notion of indistinguishability for KEM against ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2} [11] . We redescribe the security notion of IND-CCA2-KEM by considering the following attack scenario. First, the key generation algorithm is run to generate the public and private key for the protocol. The adversary can get the public key, but not the private key. Second, the adversary generates some queries of plaintext/ciphertexts and sends the queries to the encryption/decryption oracles. Each oracle encrypts/decrypts the queries and returns the results of ciphertext/plaintexts to the adversary. If the algorithm fails, this result is informed to the adversary, and the attack continues. Third, the encryption oracle does the following: 
Π KEM is secure in the sense of IND-ATK if Adv
IND-ATK
A,Π KEM (k) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Non-malleability of KEM
We provide a formal definition of non-malleability for KEM in Fig. 1 following [1] , which we call NM-KEM. We also use NM-ATK-KEM to describe the security notion of nonmalleability for KEM against ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary. (We state two more definitions in [10] .) Π KEM is secure in the sense of NM-ATK-KEM, where ATK∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, if for every polynomial p(k), A runs in p(k), outputs valid key space K in p(k), and outputs relation R computable in p(k), and Adv
We insist that the adversary is unsuccessful if some ciphertext C 0 [i] does not have a valid decryption (that is, ⊥ ∈ K).
Equivalence Results
We can obtain the equivalence of all three formal definitions and the following Theorem 1 between IND-CCA2-KEM and NM-CCA2-KEM. (For more details and proofs see [10] .)
Data Encapsulation Mechanism
Formally, data encapsulation mechanism DEM is given by a pair of algorithms DEM.Encrypt(K, M) and DEM.Decrypt (K, C), where: 
Attack Types of DEM
We introduce the following six attack types of DEM. We first consider the three attack types that involve for access to the encryption oracle. First, we state P0, that is an attack type with no access to the encryption oracle by the adversary. Second, we state P1 (Chosen Plaintext Attack). P1 is an attack type with access to the encryption oracle. However, the adversary cannot access the encryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. Third, we state P2 (Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attack). In this type, an adversary can access the encryption oracle even if after the adversary gets the target ciphertext. The last three attack types involve access to the decryption oracle. C0 is an attack type with no access to the decryption oracle by the adversary. C1 (Chosen Ciphertext Attack) is an attack type with access to the decryption oracle. However, the adversary cannot access the decryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. C2 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack), an adversary can access to the decryption oracle even after the adversary gets the target ciphertext.
Indistinguishability of DEM
We state a formal definition of indistinguishability for DEM in Fig. 2 following [9] , which we call IND-DEM. We also use IND-PX-CY-DEM to describe the security notion of indistinguishability for DEM against X,Y ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
where Let Π DEM = (DEM.Encrypt, DEM.Decrypt) be an encryption scheme over message space M and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary. We insist that A 1 (1 k ) outputs (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ M with |x 0 | = |x 1 |, where k is the security parameter. Furthermore, when Y = 2, we insist that A 2 does not ask for the decryption of challenge ciphertext y.
Π DEM is secure in the sense of IND-PX-CY for X,Y ∈ {0, 1, 2} if Adv
is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Non-malleability of DEM
We state a formal definition of non-malleability for DEM in Fig. 3 following Bellare [2] and Katz [9] , which we call NM-DEM. We also use NM-PX-CY-DEM to describe the security notion of non-malleability for DEM for X,Y ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
In Fig. 3 , M is a distribution over messages and R is some relation and k is a security parameter. We require that |x| = |x | for all x, x in the support of M. We also require that the vector of ciphertexts y output by A 2 should be nonempty. Furthermore, when Y = 2, we insist that A 2 does not ask for the decryption of y.
Π DEM is secure in the sense of NM-PX-CY for X,Y ∈ {0, 1, 2} if Adv
We note that the two above security notions of DEM yield Theorem 2. (The proof is shown in [10] ). 
Theorem 2. (NM-P2-C2-DEM ⇔ IND-P2-C2-DEM) Encryption scheme Π DEM is secure in the sense of NM-P2-C2 if and only if Π DEM is secure in the sense of IND-P2-C2.
Adv NM-PX-CY A,Π DEM (k) ≡ Pr[Expt NM-PX-CY A,Π DEM (k) = 1] −Pr[ Expt NM-PX-CY A,Π DEM (k) = 1] where Expt NM-PX-CY A,Π DEM (k) Expt NM-PX-CY A,Π DEM (k) K←{0, 1} k K←{0, 1} k (M, s)←A O 1 ,O 1 1 (1 k ) (M, s)←A O 1 ,O 1 1 x←M (x,x)←M y←DE M.Encrypt(K, x)ỹ←DE M.Encrypt(K,x) (R, y)←A O 2 ,O 2 2 (s, y) (R, y)←A O 2 ,O 2 2 (s, y) x←DE M.Decrypt(K, y) x←DE M.Decrypt(K, y) return 1 iff (y y) ∧ R(x, x) return 1 iff ( y y) ∧ R(x, x) and If X = 0 then O 1 (·) = ε and O 2 (·) = ε. If X = 1 then O 1 (·) = DE M.Encrypt(K, ·) and O 2 (·) = ε. If X = 2 then O 1 (·) = DE M.Encrypt(K, ·) and O 2 (·) = DE M.Encrypt(K, ·). If Y = 0 then O 1 (·) = ε and O 2 (·) = ε. If Y = 1 then O 1 (·) = DE M.Decrypt(K, ·) and O 2 (·) = ε. If Y = 2 then O 1 (·) = DE M.Decrypt(K, ·) and O 2 (·) = DE M.Decrypt(K, ·).
Universally Composable KEM Is Equivalent to IND-CCA2 KEM
The Key Encryption Mechanism Functionality F KEM
We define the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) functionality F KEM , in Fig. 4 . F KEM is the functionality of KEMkey-generation, KEM-encryption and KEM-decryption.
Here note that no functionality of data transmission between parties in F KEM is considered.
Functionality F KEM F KEM proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary S .
KEM.KeyGen
In the first activation, expect to receive (KEM.KeyGen, sid) from some party P j . Then,
Upon receiving (KEM Key, sid, pk) from S , send (KEM Key, sid, pk) to P j . 3. If this is the first activation then record the pair (P j , pk), otherwise pk is discarded.
KEM.Encrypt
Upon receiving (KEM.Encrypt, sid, pk ) from some party P i , proceed as follows:
• Check the memory, if pk = pk, and if P j is not corrupted, then proceed as follows:
to P i . 6. Store the pair (K, C 0 ) in memory.
• Otherwise (includes pk pk or pk is not yet recorded, or P j is corrupted), 1. Send (KEM.Encrypt with Key, sid, pk ) to S . 2. Receive (Encrypted Shared Key, sid, pk , K, C 0 ) from S . 3. Send (Encrypted Shared Key, sid, pk , K, C 0 ) to P i .
KEM.Decrypt
Upon receiving (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ) from P j (and P j only), hand (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ) to S . Upon receiving (Shared Key, sid, K ) from S , proceed as follows:
1. If a pair (K, C 0 ) exists in memory, send (Shared Key, sid, K) to P j . 2. Otherwise, send (Shared Key, sid, K ) to P j . Fig. 4 The key encapsulation mechanism functionality. In more detail, we prove that we can construct an environment Z and a real life adversary A such that for any ideal process adversary (simulator) S , Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and π KEM or with S in the ideal process for F KEM by using adversary G that breaks NM-CCA2-KEM. Z proceeds as follows:
1. Activates key receiver P j with (KEM.KeyGen, sid), and obtains pk. 2. Activates P i with (KEM.Encrypt, sid, pk), and obtains (K * , C 0 * ). 3. Activates G with pk and C 0 * , obtains (R, C 0 ), where R is some relation. is generated by S . For C 0 * , G successfully obtains (R, C 0 ). However Z cannot output 1 in Step 5 because there is no relation R(K , K ).
("if" part) We show that if π KEM does not securely realize F KEM , then π KEM is not IND-CCA2-KEM. In more detail, we assume that there is an adversary A such that for any simulator S , there is an environment Z that can distinguish with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with S in the ideal process for F KEM or with parties running π KEM and adversary A in the real-life world. We then prove that π KEM is not IND-CCA2-secure by using the distinguishable environment Z.
We will show that Z can distinguish only when receiver P j is not corrupted. We discuss all the cases as follows.
(Case 1: Receiver P j is corrupted.) In this case, we can make simulator S such that the environment Z cannot distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world. Once A corrupts P j , simulator S corrupts dummy party P j . However, receiver P i is not corrupted, that is, P i is honest. Simulator S proceeds as follows: In this case, Z cannot distinguish the real world from the ideal world because S can reconstruct by using the simulated copy of A. Note that, A can stop protocol π KEM . Even if this situation happens, Z cannot distinguish the real world from the ideal world, because S can also stop the protocol. (Case 2: P j is not corrupted.) We look at the generated key and ciphertext by P i in each world.
• In the real life world, π KEM runs among the honest parties, P i generates corresponding pair (K * , C * 0 ) by running algorithm KEM.Encrypt(pk).
• In the ideal process world, when P i sends (KEM.Encrypt, sid, pk) to F KEM , F KEM obtains C 0 from S , and F KEM chooses shared key K R ← − {0, 1} * at random. It then sends (Encrypted Shared Key, sid, pk, K, C 0 ) to P i .
It is easily seen that C 0 is not concerned with key K (because F KEM randomly generates the key K). In the real world, Z obtains the corresponding pair (K * , C 0 * ). However, in the ideal world, Z obtains the non-corresponding pair (K, C 0 ). Consequently, we can construct environment Z that can distinguish the real world from the ideal world.
Recall the formal settings, there are three types of messages between Z and A. That is, Z sends A a message either to corrupt parties, or to report on messages sending, or to deliver some message. In this protocol, no party corruption occurs during execution since we consider non-adaptive adversaries. Furthermore, parties don't send messages to each other. Therefore, there are no requests to report on or deliver messages. Thus, the only way that S can affect the output of Z is communication via F KEM . As a result, S proceeds as follows: We assume that there is an environment Z that can distinguish the interaction in the real life world from that in the ideal process world. We prove that we can construct an adversary F that breaks IND-CCA2-KEM by using the distinguishable environment Z. Precisely, for some value of security parameter z for Z, we assume that there is an environment Z such that IDEAL F,S ,Z (z) -REAL π KEM ,A,Z (z) > σ, we then show that F correctly guesses bit b with probability 1 2 + σ 2l in the CCA2 game, where l is the total number of times the encryption oracle is involved.
F is given public key pk, and is allowed to query the decryption oracle and encryption oracle. First, F chooses a number h R ← − {1, . . . , l} at random. Second, F simulates Z on the following simulated interaction with a system running π KEM . Let K i and C 0i denote the i-th key and ciphertext that Z asks to be encrypted in this simulation, respectively.
1. When Z activates some party P j with (KEM.KeyGen, sid), F lets P j output the value pk from F s input. 2. For the first h − 1 times that Z asks some party P i to generate shared key K i , F lets P i return (K i , C 0i ) by using algorithm (K i , C 0i ) = KEM.Encrypt(pk). 3. The h-th time that Z asks to generate key K h , F queries its encryption oracle with pk, and obtains corresponding pair X= (K h , C 0h ) or non-corresponding pair X = (K h , C 0h ) from the encryption oracle. Accordingly, F hands X to Z as the test pair. 4. For the remaining l − h times that Z asks P i to generate
* randomly and C 0 from the output of algorithm KEM.Encrypt(pk). 5. Whenever Z activates decryptor P j with (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ), where C 0 = C 0i for some i, F lets P i return the corresponding key K i for any i. If C 0 is different from all the C 0i 's, F sends C 0 to its decryption oracle, obtains value v, and lets P j return v to Z. 6. When Z halts, F outputs whatever Z outputs and halts.
We apply a standard hybrid argument to analyze the success probability of F. Let the random variable D i denote the output of Z from an interaction that is identical to an interaction with S in the ideal process, except that the first i pairs are computed with correct generation, and the last pair are computed with non-corresponding generation. We can see that D 0 is identical to the output of Z in the ideal pro-cess world, and D l is identical to the output of Z in the real life world. (This follows from the fact that the mechanism KEM guarantees that KEM.Decrypt(sk, C 0 ) = K, where C 0 = KEM.Encrypt(pk), this is called "soundness.") Furthermore, in the simulation of F, if the value C 0h that F obtains from its encryption oracle is the encryption of K h then the output of the simulated Z has the distribution of D h−1 . If C 0h does not correspond to the encryption of the key, then the output of the simulated Z has the distribution of D h . As discussed above, we can construct attacker F by using the distinguishable environment Z. We can conclude that if π KEM does not securely realize F KEM , then π KEM is not IND-CCA2-KEM.
Universally Composable DEM Is Equivalent to IND-P2-C2 DEM
The KEM-DEM Functionality F KEM-DEM
We define KEM-DEM functionality F KEM-DEM in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . F KEM-DEM is the hybrid usage of KEM and DEM, KEM-key-generation, KEM-encryption, KEMdecryption, DEM-encryption and DEM-decryption. Information obtained in KEM-encryption and KEM-decryption is transfered to DEM-encryption and DEM-decryption inside F KEM-DEM . Here note that there is no functionality of data transmission between parties in F KEM-DEM .
UC DEM Is Equivalent to IND-P2-C2 DEM
First, we define protocol π KEM-DEM in Fig. 7 that is constructed on algorithm DEM = (DEM.Encrypt, DEM.Decrypt) in the F KEM -hybrid model. We say that the underlying DEM is UC secure if and only if π KEM-DEM securely realizes F KEM-DEM in the F KEM -hybrid model. Therefore, the following theorem implies that UC DEM is equivalent to IND-P2-C2 DEM.
Theorem 4. Protocol π KEM-DEM securely realizes F KEM-DEM with respect to non-adaptive adversaries in the F KEMhybrid model if and only if DEM is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks(IND-P2-C2 DEM).
Proof. (sketch) ("only if" part) Because NM-P2-C2-DEM equals IND-P2-C2-DEM by Theorem 2, we prove that if π DEM (is denoted as a transformed protocol from DEM to, like π KEM ) is not NM-P2-C2-DEM secure, then π KEM-DEM does not securely realize F KEM-DEM in the F KEM -hybrid model. In more detail, we prove that we can construct an environment Z and a real life adversary A such that for any ideal process adversary (simulator) S , Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and π KEM-DEM or with S in the ideal process for F KEM-DEM by using the adversary which breaks NM-P2-C2-DEM. Note that A corrupts no party and Z sends no messages to A. We assume that there exists a successful Functionality F KEM-DEM F KEM-DEM proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary S .
KEM.KeyGen
In the first activation, expect to receive (KEM.KeyGen, sid) from some party P j . Then, 1. Send (KEM.KeyGen, sid) to S . 2. Upon receiving (KEM Key, sid, pk) from S , send (KEM Key, sid, pk) to P j .
KEM.Encrypt
• If entry (P i , C, active) is not in memory for any C, 1. Send (KEM.Encrypt, sid, pk ) to S , and receive (Encrypted Shared Key, sid, pk , C 0 ) from S . 2. Send (Encrypted Shared Key, sid, pk , C 0 ) to P i , and store the pair (pk , C 0 ) and (P i , C 0 , active) in memory.
• Otherwise, do nothing.
KEM.Decrypt
Upon receiving (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ) from P j (and P j only), hand (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ) to S . Upon receiving ok from S , proceed as follows:
• If an entry (P j , C, active) is not in memory for any C, send ok to P j and store the pair (P j , C 0 , active) in memory.
DEM.Encrypt
Upon receiving (DEM.Encrypt, sid, m) from party P e (e ∈ {i, j} only), proceed as follows:
• If (P e , C 0 , active) is stored in memory.
-If both P i and P j are uncorrupted, then proceeds as follows:
1. Send (DEM.Encrypt, sid, |m|) to S , where |m| denotes the length of m and receive (DEM.Ciphertext, sid, c ) from S . 2. Send (DEM.Ciphertext, sid, c ) to P e , and store the entry (m, c , C 0 ) in memory.
-Otherwise, proceeds as follows:
1. Send(DEM.Encrypt, sid, m) to S , and receive (DEM.Ciphertext, sid, c ) from S . 2. Send (DEM.Ciphertext, sid, c ) to P e , and store the entry (m, c , C 0 ) in memory.
• Otherwise, do nothing. attacker G for π DEM in the sense of NM-P2-C2-DEM. Environment Z proceeds as usual, except that Z runs a simulated copy of G. Z proceeds as above, except that Z runs a simulated copy of G. In more detail:
Upon receiving (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c ) from P e (e ∈ {i, j} only), hand (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c ) to S . Upon receiving (DEM.Plaintext, sid, φ) from S , proceed as follows:
• If entry (P e , C, active) exists in memory for some C: If entry (m, c , C) , sid, φ) to P e , and record entry (φ, c , C) in memory.
Fig. 6
The KEM-DEM functionality.
1. Activates key receiver P j with (KEM.KeyGen, sid), then obtains pk. When Z interacts with A and π KEM-DEM , Z obtains ciphertext c in Step 4. In this case, Z returns 1 in Step 7. Therefore, when Z interacts with A and π KEM-DEM , Z outputs 1 with non-negligible probability. On the other hand, when Z interacts with S in the ideal process for F KEM , Z also obtains ciphertext c in Step 4. For ciphertext c, G successfully obtains (R, c). However Z cannot output 1 in Step 7 because there is no relation R(m, m ).
("if" part) We prove that if π KEM-DEM does not securely realize F KEM-DEM , then π DEM is not IND-P2-C2-DEM. In more detail, we assume that there is an adversary A such that for any simulator S , there is an environment Z that can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with F KEM-DEM and S in the ideal process world or with parties running π KEM-DEM and the adversary A in the real life world. Next, we prove that there is an adversary F that can break IND-P2-C2-DEM by using distinguishable Z. Note that there are three cases of party corruption since we take account of non-adaptive adversaries.
Recall the formal settings, there are three types of messages between Z and A. That is, Z sends A a message either to corrupt parties, or to report on message sending, or to deliver some message. In this protocol, no party corruption 1. Upon input (KEM.KeyGen, sid), P j sends (KEM.Key Gen, sid 1 ) to F KEM . 2. Upon receiving (KEM Key, sid 1 , pk) from F KEM , P j outputs pk.
KEM.Encrypt
Upon input (KEM.Encrypt, sid, pk) within party P i ,
• If boolean variable active is not set,
2. Upon receiving (Encrypted Shared key, sid 1 , pk, K, C 0 ) from F KEM , then P i outputs C 0 and stores key K in memory and sets a boolean variable active in memory.
KEM.Decrypt
Upon input (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C 0 ) within P j ,
2. Upon receiving (Shared Key sid 1 , K), P j stores K in memory and outputs ok and sets a boolean variable active in memory.
Data Encapsulation Mechanism DEM
DEM.Encrypt
Upon input (DEM.Encrypt, sid, m) from P e (e ∈ {i, j}), proceed as follows:
• If the boolean variable is active in P e 's memory, P e obtains ciphertext c = DEM.Encrypt(K, m) and outputs (DEM Ciphertext, sid, c).
• Otherwise do nothing.
DEM.Decrypt
Upon input (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c) from P e (e ∈ {i, j}), proceed as follows:
• If the boolean variable is active in P e 's memory, P e obtains m = DEM.Decrypt (K, c) and outputs (DEM Plaintext, sid, m).
• Otherwise do nothing. occurs during execution since we consider non-adaptive adversaries. Furthermore, parties don't send messages to each other. Therefore, there are no requests to report on or deliver messages. In fact, there is no communication between Z and A at all. Thus, the only way that S affects the output of Z is the communication via F KEM-DEM .
We will show that Z can distinguish what is only when both sender P i and receiver P j are not corrupted. We discuss all the cases for the following simulator S as follows: (Case 1: Sender P i is corrupted.) In this case, once A corrupts P i , simulator S corrupts dummy party P i . However, receiver P j is not corrupted, that is, P j is honest. Environment Z cannot distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world for the above simulator S because S can reconstruct by using the simulated copy of A. Note that, A can stop the protocol π KEM-DEM . Even if this situation happens, Z cannot distinguish the real world from the ideal world, because S can also stop the protocol.
(Case 2: Receiver P j is corrupted.) In this case, once A corrupts P j , simulator S corrupts dummy party P j . However, sender P i is not corrupted, that is, P i is honest. Environment Z cannot distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world by the above simulator S because simulator S can reconstruct by using the simulated copy of A.
(Case 3: No party is corrupted.) In this case, sender P i and receiver P j are not corrupted i.e., they are honest parties. We look at the generated key and ciphertext by P i in each world.
• In the real life world, π KEM-DEM runs among the honest parties, P i generates c by running algorithm DEM.Encrypt (K, m) . Note that c corresponds to m. • In the ideal process world, F KEM-DEM sends (DEM.
Encrypt, sid, |m|) to S . P i obtains c from S via F KEM-DEM . Note that c does not correspond to m because S sees only the length of m.
By applying a hybrid argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3, we can obtain adversary F that attacks IND-P2-C2-DEM by using the environment Z that can distinguish the real world from the ideal world.
A Universally Composable Secure Channel Based on the KEM-DEM Framework
To realize secure channel functionality, F SC , defined in [5] , we define a secure channel protocol π SC in Fig. 8 P j , sid ) ) to F SIG , receives (Verification Key, (P j , sid ), PK j ). 6. P j sends (Register, P j , PK j ) to F CA , then sends (Sign, P j , C 0 ) to F SIG , receives (Signature, (P j , sid ), C 0 , σ) from F SIG . 7. P j sends (sid, C 0 , σ, P j ) to P i , and sets a boolean variable active. 8. Upon receiving (sid, C 0 , σ, P j ), P i checks whether (sid, P j ) is stored. If it is not stored, discard the message. Otherwise, P i sends (Retrieve, P j ) to F CA and receives (Retrieve, P j , PK j ), then sends (Verify, (P j , sid ), C 0 , σ, PK j ) to F SIG and receives (Verified, functionality [4] . (Due to the page limitation, we omit the description of F SIG and F CA . See [4] for the definitions.) In combination with the previous theorems, the following theorem implies that IND-CCA2 KEM, IND-P2-C2 DEM, secure signatures and ideal CA are sufficient to UCrealize F SC . sid ) ), obtain the response (Verification Key, (P j , sid ), PK j ) from A; send to A (in the name of F CA ) the message (Registered, P j , PK j ), obtain the response ok from A; send to A (in the name of F SIG ) the message (Sign, (P j , sid ), C 0 ), obtain the response (Signature, (P j , sid ), C 0 , σ) from A; send to A (in the name of F CA ) the message (Retrieve, P j , P i ), obtain the response ok from A; send to A (in the name of F SIG ) the message (Verify, (P j , sid ), C 0 , σ, PK j ), obtain the response (Verified, (P j , sid ), C 0 , φ) from A; send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (KEM.Decrypt, sid 1 , C 0 , PK i ), obtain the response ok from A. 3. (Simulating the interaction of A in the data exchange) Upon receiving a message (sid, P e , u) (e ∈ {i, j}) from F SC (which means that P e sent a message of length u to Pē), simulate for A the process of exchanging shared key between P i and P j . That is, play functionality F KEM-DEM for A as follows: send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Encrypt, sid 1 , |m|), obtain the response (DEM.Ciphertext, sid 1 , c) from A; send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Decrypt, sid 1 , c), obtain the response (DEM.Plaintext, sid 1 , ψ) from A.
(Simulating the interaction of a corrupted party)
Simulating the interaction of a corrupted party can be done by simulating the functionalities and transmissions in the natural way. Considering all cases of the party corruption, we have three cases of party corruption -(Case 1: Sender P i is corrupted), (Case 2: Receiver P j is corrupted) and (Case 3: both P i and P j are corrupted) as follows: • (Case 2: Receiver P j is corrupted.)
-(Simulating the interaction of A in the session set-up) This situation is same as the case that P j is not corrupted as above. -(Simulating the interaction of A in the data exchange) Upon receiving a message (sid, P e , u) (e ∈ {i, j}) from F SC , simulate for A the process of exchanging shared key between P i and P j . That is, play functionality F KEM-DEM for A as follows: send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Encrypt, sid 1 , |m|), obtain the response (DEM.Ciphertext, sid 1 , c) from A since sender P i is not corrupted; send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Decrypt, sid 1 , c), obtain the response (DEM.Plaintext, sid 1 , ψ) from A.
• (Case 3: Both P i and P j are corrupted.)
-(Simulating the interaction of A in the session set-up) This situation is same as the case that no party is corrupted as above. -(Simulating the interaction of A in the data exchange) Upon receiving a message (sid, P e , u) (e ∈ {i, j}) from F SC , simulate for A the process of exchanging shared key between P i and P j . That is, play functionality F KEM-DEM for A as follows: send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Encrypt, sid 1 , m), obtain the response (DEM.Ciphertext, sid 1 , c) from A; send to A (in the name of F KEM-DEM ) the message (DEM.Decrypt, sid 1 , c), obtain the response (DEM.Plaintext, sid 1 , ψ) from A.
In all three cases, S can simulate as above by using a simulated copy of A.
(Simulating party corruption)
We deal with an adaptive adversary that can corrupt parties at any time.
Referring to the UC framework, environment Z activates a party or an adversary (or simulator) in the order of input. That is, Z has nothing to activate at the same time (because this framework deal with the ITM). Considering adversary corruption, adversary corrupts at the following points.
a. Before activating with (Establish-session, sid, P j , initiator) in the Session Set-up. b. Before activating with (Establish-session, sid, P i , responder) in the Session Set-up. c. Before activating with (Send, sid, m) in the Data Exchange. d. Before activating with (Expire-session, sid) in the Session Ending.
However, case (a) is the same as the non-adaptive adversary on each party corruption as above. Whenever A corrupts a party, S corrupts that party in the ideal process and forwards the obtained information to the simulated copy of A. If the simulated copy of A corrupts a party P i or P j then S corrupts P i or P j in the ideal process, and provides A with the simulated international state of the corrupted party. (It is easy to verify that this state is always implied by the information already known to S at the time of corruption from the simulated copy of A.) Additionally, in this protocol, no party has any secret information because F KEM-DEM , F CA and F SIG are run securely. In all cases, since S can simulate A by using his simulated world, Z cannot distinguish the real life world from ideal process world. That is, simulating party corruption is done perfectly.
It is straightforward to verify that the simulation is perfect. That is, for any environment Z and A, it holds that the view of Z interacting with S and F SC is distributed identically to the view of Z interacting with A and parties running protocol π SC in the (F KEM-DEM , F SIG , F CA )-hybrid model.
Conclusion
The KEM-DEM framework is a promising formulation for hybrid encryption based on symmetric and asymmetric encryption, and will be standardized in ISO in the near future. This paper studied the possibility of constructing a UC secure channel using the KEM-DEM framework. We presented that IND-CCA2 KEM and IND-P2-C2 DEM along with secure signatures and ideal certification authority are sufficient to realize a UC secure channel. This paper also showed several equivalence results: UC KEM, IND-CCA2 KEM and NM-CCA2 KEM are equivalent, and UC DEM, IND-P2-C2 DEM and NM-P2-C2 DEM are equivalent.
